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Abstract
The principles of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM) and Simplification
of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA) have received substantial attention in
isolation. Both principles are plausible generalizations about natural lan-
guage conditionals. There is however little discussion of their interaction.
This paper aims to remedy this gap and explore the significance of hav-
ing both principles constrain the logic of the conditional. Our negative
finding is that, together with elementary logical assumptions, CEM and
SDA yield a variety of implausible consequences. Despite these incom-
patibility results, we open up a narrow space to satisfy both. We show
that, by simultaneously appealing to the alternative-introducing analysis
of disjunction and to the theory of homogeneity presuppositions, we can
satisfy both. Furthermore, the theory that validates both principles re-
sembles a recent semantics that is defended by Santorio on independent
grounds. The cost of this approach is that it must give up the transitivity
of entailment: we suggest that this is a feature, not a bug, and connect it
with recent developments of intransitive notions of entailment.
1 Introduction
David Lewis’s logic for the counterfactual conditional (Lewis 1973) famously
invalidates two plausible-sounding principles: simplification of disjunctive
antecedents (SDA),1 and conditional excluded middle (CEM).2 Simplification
states that conditionals with disjunctive antecedents entail conditionals whose
antecedents are the disjuncts taken in isolation. For instance, given SDA, (1) en-
tails (2).
*Special thanks to Shawn Standefer for extensive written comments on a previous version
of this paper and to anonymous reviewers for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and the
Amsterdam Colloquium. Also thanks to Andrew Bacon, Ivano Ciardelli, Simon Charlow, Kai
von Fintel, Branden Fitelson, Jeremy Goodman, Nathan Howard, Daniel Rothschild, Jeff Rus-
sell, Paolo Santorio, Mark Schroeder, Alexis Wellwood, Lee Walters, Dan Waxman, audiences at
LENLS 14, the 2017 Amsterdam Colloquium, and the USC Mind and Language Group.
1See Fine 1975; Nute 1975; Lewis 1977; and Nute 1980a.
2See Stalnaker 1981; von Fintel 1997; DeRose 1999; Williams 2010; and Klinedinst 2011.
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(1) If Hiro or Ezra had come, we would have solved the puzzle.
(2) If Hiro had come, we would have solved the puzzle and if Ezra had
come, we would have solved the puzzle.
Conditional Excluded Middle is the claim that the (boolean) disjunction of
A > C and A > ¬C must be a logical truth. Against the background of classical
logic, a distinctive consequence of CEM is that the negation of A > C entails
A > ¬C. For instance, (3) entails (4).
(3) It is not the case that if Hiro had come we would have solved the puzzle.
(4) If Hiro had come, we would not have solved the puzzle.
Much attention has been devoted to these heretical principles in isolation, but
virtually no work has considered their interaction. Since there are strong rea-
sons to accept both principles, it is urgent to investigate how they might be
made to fit.
The pessimistic finding at the center of this paper is that the heresies do
not mix easily. We present a battery of impossibility results showing that no
traditional theory of conditionals or disjunction can allow them to coexist. The
general shape of these results is that given a variety of minimal assumptions
about conditionals, disjunction, and logical consequence, the combination of
our two heresies requires that the conditional either be the material condi-
tional or share some undesirable property with it.
Despite these negative findings, we argue that the project of combining
CEM and SDA is not hopeless. To validate both principles, we synthesize two
different tools that can independently be used to validate each principle indi-
vidually. Speaking abstractly, these tools are operations on possible semantic
values of the conditional: given a possible semantic valuem and some inferen-
tial pattern P , the operation produces a new semantic valuem′ which is related
to m in some way and validates P (whether or not m did).
In the case of SDA, we turn to the idea that disjunctions involve alterna-
tives (for example, Alonso-Ovalle 2006), introducing a general mechanism
that turns any candidate semantic value for the conditional into a derived one
that is guaranteed to validate SDA. Unfortunately, this tool alone does not yield
CEM in full generality—even if we start out with a conditional connective that
validates CEM. In particular, CEM won’t be guaranteed for conditionals with
disjunctive antecedents. In the case of CEM, we turn to the growing semantic
tradition that invokes homogeneity inferences (von Fintel 1997; Križ 2015b).
Building on the idea of homogeneity, we identify a tool that forces the validity
of CEM, no matter what conditional we begin with. The drawback of this tool
is that some appealing generalizations of SDA fail. In particular, simplification
fails for might conditionals like "if it rains or snows, you might need boots".
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We show that these problems can be solved by using both tools in se-
quence. This, then, is the shape of our final proposal: start with any condi-
tional semantic value; inject alternative sensitivity, thus securing SDA; finally,
inject homogeneity presuppositions, thus securing CEM. It turns out that the
resulting conditional need not be trivial or equivalent to the material con-
ditional. in fact, this procedure can yield a conditional connective that was
recently defended, on different grounds, by Santorio 2017.
The resulting theory leads, however, to one last heresy: the entailment re-
lation must fail to be transitive. In particular, while CEM is valid in the resulting
theory, other principles are invalid that are logical consequences of CEM. We
conclude by discussing this feature of our view and connecting it with other
work on intransitive entailment. We also note some options for approximating
the explanatory insight behind our proposal within more classical frameworks
in which the transitivity of entailment is secured, but the intransitive behavior
is emulated by some other means.
Our negative results and our positive discussion should be of particu-
lar significance to those theorists who are committed to frameworks that are
founded on endorsing one of the heresies. For example, validating SDA is a
founding assumption of truth-maker semantics (Fine, 2012). Given our re-
sults, friends of truth-maker semantics who also want to endorse CEM need
broader revisions than one might otherwise anticipate. The same is true of
those frameworks on which conditionals denote selection functions (Stalnaker,
1968, 1973, 1981), which in turn are founded on the idea that CEM is valid.
2 The Case for the Heresies
In this section, we restate and defend our two principles. Letting ‘|−’ denote
the consequence relation, simplification of disjunctive antecedents can be for-
mulated as the following entailment:3
SDA. (A or B) > C |− (A > C)∧ (B > C)
The main argument for SDA seems to consist entirely in the observation that
instances like the one from (1) to (2) sound extremely compelling (see Fine
1975, p.453-454).
Of course, a conclusive case for the validity of SDA does require some kind
of defense beyond "it sounds pretty plausible". For instance, it is well known
(Fine 1975; Ellis et al. 1977) that SDA has troublesome downstream conse-
quences: in the presence of a principle of substitution for logical equivalents,
SDA entails antecedent strengthening (A > C |− A+ > C, where A+ |− A). We will
investigate these consequences and their significance below, but the point for
3In formulating, SDA, we use or, as opposed to ‘∨’ because much of the evidence for SDA re-
lies on the intuitive plausibility of its natural language instances and we do not assume at the
outset that natural language disjunction is boolean.
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now is that the preliminary motivation for SDA tends to be clear and strong
judgments about the validity of its instances.
Conditional excluded middle can be formulated abstractly as a validity
claim:
CEM. |− (A > B)∨ (A > ¬B)
Unlike SDA, CEM is not typically justified by direct intuitions of validity about
its instances. Instead, defenders of CEM propose that various linguistic phe-
nomena fall into their proper place once we posit the validity of this schema.
For instance, one might think that (3), which is of the form ¬(hiro > puzzle),
intuitively entails (4), which is of the form hiro > ¬puzzle. Given CEM, this
inference turns into an application of disjunctive syllogism.
More generally, conditionals involving will and would consequents fail to
enter into scope relations that would be expected if CEM failed. (The playbook
for this sort of argument is laid out in the seminal discussion of Stalnaker
1981, p.137-139). A recent version of this argument relies on data involving
attitude verbs that lexicalize negation (see Cariani and Santorio, 2018, for a
version of this argument involving will). In the case of would, the argument
centers around the observation that (5) and (6) sound equivalent:
(5) I doubt that if you had slept in, you would have passed.
(6) I believe that if you had slept in, you would have failed.
The equivalence is easily explained if CEM is valid (and assuming that failing
equals not passing). The speaker doubts sleep > pass; if there was a way for this
conditional to be false other than by sleep > fail being true, it should be possible
to accept (5) without accepting (6). By contrast, it is hard, if not impossible, to
explain without it.
This argument streamlines an older argument for CEM involving the inter-
action between conditionals and quantifiers.4 Consider:
(7) No student will succeed if he goofs off.
(8) Every student will fail if he goofs off.
(7) and (8) are intuitively equivalent. They appear to involve quantifiers tak-
ing scope over conditionals. Given CEM and this scope assumption, they are
predicted equivalent. Take an arbitrary student, and suppose it is false of him
that he will succeed if he goofs off. By CEM it follows that he will fail if he goofs
off. This batch of data involving will-conditionals looks equally compelling
when considering counterfactual conditionals (Klinedinst, 2011).
(9) No student would have succeeded if he had goofed off.
4See Higginbotham 1986; von Fintel and Iatridou 2002; Leslie 2009; and Klinedinst 2011
for discussion.
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(10) Every student would have failed if he had goofed off.
On reflection, we take the interaction of conditionals and quantifiers to also
favor CEM, for both indicative and counterfactual conditionals.
Yet another argument for CEM is based on the interaction between if and
only.5 CEM can help explain why only if conditionals imply their if...then coun-
terparts. Consider the following conditionals:
(11) The flag flies only if the Queen is home.
(12) If the flag flies, then the Queen is home.
(13) The flag flies if the Queen isn’t home.
(11) entails (12). In von Fintel 1997 this entailment is derived compositionally,
on the assumption that only in (11) takes wide scope with respect to the condi-
tional. Only then negates the alternatives to the conditional the flag flies if the
Queen is home, which are assumed to include (13). Given some background
assumptions, CEM and the negation of (13) imply (12).6
This short catalogue does not exhaust the motivation for CEM,7 but it pro-
vides sufficient motivation to explore the relationship between CEM and other
plausible principles like SDA.
Before moving on, it is worth highlighting that these arguments for CEM re-
quire that the relevant conditional connective not be the material conditional.
The material conditional, of course, does validate CEM, but it does so in a
way that is incompatible with the explanatory benefits we just noted. For
instance, the quantifiers argument relied essentially on the ‘Weak Boethius’
Thesis’(WBT)—the claim that A > C and A > ¬C cannot both be true (when A is
consistent).8
WBT. A > C;A > ¬C |=⊥
Without this assumption, it could be that some student will fail if he goofs
off, but will also succeed if he goofs off. But the material conditional invali-
dates this principle, allowing both conditionals to be true when A is false. In
this case, the negative conditional (10) would be stronger than the positive
conditional (9), since the positive conditional can be true simply because the
relevant individuals did not actually goof off. Similar points can be established
for our other arguments.9
5See Barker 1993 and von Fintel 1997 for discussion.
6For some experimental evidence that support the inferential judgments involved in this
argument, see Cariani and Rips ms..
7For other arguments and further discussion, see Cross 2009, Goodman ms., Williams 2010.
8For discussion, see Pizzi and Williamson 2005.
9Both arguments are incompatible with the material conditional because the negation of a
material conditional tends to be quite strong, entailing the antecedent and the negation of the
consequent. But the attitudes argument requires negating the conditional "if you had slept in,
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This last point is relevant to the interpretation of our negative results. For
example, we will shortly show that SDA and CEM jointly imply collapse to the
material conditional. One might reason as follows: CEM gives you something
good (it explains the data in this section) and something bad (together with
SDA it yields implausible consequences); the way to have both CEM and SDA is to
go in for the material conditional; so if CEM’s goodies outweigh the bad conse-
quences, we have an argument for the material conditional. However, this in-
terpretation would be incorrect, because the Weak Boethius Thesis (which the
material conditional violates) is essentially involved in delivering the goodies.
Without WBT all of the positive arguments in favor of CEM are undercut.
3 Incompatibility Results
Having introduced our favorite conditional heresies, we explain why it is dif-
ficult to jointly accept them. In §3.1, we show that, given modest logical as-
sumptions, CEM and SDA collapse to the material conditional. The next result
(in §3.2) dispenses with most of the logical assumptions and yields the con-
clusion that CEM and SDA collectively entail that the conditional is, in a certain
respect, trivial. While we derive these results syntactically, we note in §3.3
that there are related collapse results that exploit semantic reasoning only.
In keeping with a distinction we have drawn in the previous section, we
appeal to two notions of disjunction: (i) natural language or (which we used
in stating SDA) and (ii) boolean disjunction, symbolized ‘∨’ (which we used in
stating CEM). It will strengthen our argument to refrain from assuming that
these connectives have the same semantic value. Our results require classical
assumptions about the logic of ‘∨’ but very few assumptions about the logic of
or.
3.1 Collapse
CEM and SDA together imply collapse to the material conditional, given rela-
tively modest assumptions about the logic. We assume standard sequent rules
for classical connectives as well as the standard structural rules governing
classical logic.10 Among the structural rules, the transitivity of entailment–
which is itself a consequence of the Cut rule–will play a very important role
in our discussion.
Transitivity. if A |− B and B |− C, then A |− C
you would have passed" and the argument involving only if requires negating (13). One specific
problematic consequence of this would be that, according to the material conditional analysis,
only if conditionals would imply the truth of their consequent and the falsity of the antecedent.
(11) clearly does not have this implication.
10For contemporary sources on the sort system we presuppose, see Buss 1998, Troelstra and
Schwichtenberg 2000; Restall 2000; Bimbó 2014; Negri and von Plato 2001.
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Cut. if X |− A and Y ,A |− B, then X,Y |− B
(notation: X and Y denote sets of sentences and that X,A denotes X ∪ {A}.)
Several of our proofs rely on disjunction rules, so it is worth stating them
explicitly.
Cases. if X,A |− C and Y ,B |− C, then X,Y , (A∨B) |− C
∨-Intro. if X,A |− B, then X,A |− B∨C
To these, add specific assumptions about conditionals (three dedicated se-
quent axioms and one new rule):
Modus Ponens. A,A > C |− C
Reflexivity. |− A > A
Agglomeration. A > B,A > C |− A > (B∧C)
Upper Monotonicity. if B |− C, then X,A > B |− A > C
While these assumptions are not entirely uncontroversial, they are generally
accepted in the literature.11
For ease of reference, we call this combination of assumptions the classical
package. We can now state our result more precisely.
Fact 1 Given the classical package, CEM and SDA imply that A > C | − ¬A∨C.
We prove this equivalence in stages. First stage: SDA and CEM jointly
imply the True Consequent paradox of material implication.
True Consequent. C |− A > C
Next stage: proving this is enough to reach full collapse, in combi-
nation with the classical package.
Comments on notation: Individual lines in the proofs below ab-
breviate multiple reasoning steps in the full sequent proof. At step
5 we note an implicit application of classical reasoning by citing
something (LEM) that is not a rule in the actual proof system. Each
line is annotated with a list of all the rules on which the suppressed
piece of reasoning depends.
First, we prove that True Consequent follows from SDA and CEM.
11For instance, many of those who dispute the validity of modus ponens accept the validity
of some special forms of the inference. In particular, conditionals that do not themselves con-
tain further modals or conditionals are generally believed to validate modus ponens even by
those who doubt the general validity of the inference (e.g. McGee 1985, Kolodny and MacFar-
lane 2010). These restricted versions of modus ponens are sufficient to yield our results.
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1. |− ((A or ¬A) > C)∨ ((A or ¬A) > ¬C) CEM
2. |− (A > C∧¬A > C)∨ (A > ¬C∧¬A > ¬C) 1, cases, SDA, cut
3. C,¬(A > C) |− (A > ¬C∧¬A > ¬C) 2, cases, cut, weakening
4. (A∨¬A), (A > ¬C∧¬A > ¬C) |− ¬C cases, ponens
5. C,¬(A > C) |− ¬C 3, 4, cut, LEM
6. C |− A > C 5, negation rules
We can then show that another paradox of material implication,
False Antecedent, follows from True Consequent plus the classical
package.
False Antecedent. ¬A |− A > C
1. ¬A |− A > ¬A TC
2. ¬A |− A > ¬A∧A > A 1, reflexivity, conjunction rule
3. ¬A |− A > (¬A∧A) 2, agglomeration, cut
4. ¬A |− A > C 3, upper monotonicity, cut
Finally, we can use the classical package to show that TC and FA
imply collapse.
1. ¬A∨C |− A > C cases, FA, TC
2. A > C,A |− C ponens
3. A > C |− ¬A∨C 2, material conditional intro
Previous work on SDA has shown that it sits in major tension with the substitu-
tion of logical equivalents (Fine 1975; Ellis et al. 1977). Interestingly, our own
result makes no use of this principle. More generally, we make no assumptions
about the semantic or logical properties of or, except that it supports SDA.
3.2 The Interconnectedness of All Things
Fact 1 requires a number of assumptions about the classicality of the condi-
tional, disjunction, and logical consequence. Furthermore, the argument ap-
peals to rather artificial instances of CEM—ones with antecedents of the form
A or ¬A. If we are satisfied with a slightly weaker conclusion, a closely related
result can be derived with far fewer assumptions and without appealing to
conditionals with tautological antecedents.
The result is that combining CEM and SDA forces the conditional to validate
an undesirable schema, which we call IAT for "the Interconnectedness of All
Things".
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IAT. (A > C∧B > C)∨ (A > ¬C∧B > ¬C)
The reason why validating IAT is undesirable is that it requires an extreme level
of dependence among arbitrary distinct sentences. Consider an instance of the
above in which A="Abe flies", B="Bea runs" and C="Cleo swims". Then it must
be that either both Abe flies > Cleo Swims and Bea runs > Cleo swims are true
or both Abe flies > Cleo does not swim and Bea runs > Cleo does not swim are.
Among other things, this appears to entail that it is incoherent to reject both
of the following:
(14) If Abe flies, then Cleo swims.
(15) If Bea runs, then Cleo does not swim.
It would be incorrect to say that nothing that is recognizably a conditional
validates IAT. For one thing, the material conditional does.12 Nonetheless, we
comfortably assert that only unsatisfactory conditional connectives satisfy IAT.
With an eye to our later discussion, we provide an explicit statement and
proof of the result.
Fact 2 Given disjunction rules, cut, CEM, and SDA, IAT must be a logical truth.
1. |− [(A or B) > C]∨ [(A or B) > ¬C] CEM
2. (A or B) > C |− (A > C∧B > C) SDA
3. (A > C∧B > C) |− IAT ∨-Intro
4. (A or B) > C |− IAT 2, 3, cut
5. (A or B) > ¬C |− (A > ¬C∧B > ¬C) SDA
6. (A > ¬C∧B > ¬C) |− IAT ∨-Intro
7. (A or B) > ¬C |− IAT 5, 6, cut
8. |− IAT 1, 4, 7, cases, cut
In addition to the intuitive reasons we gave against the validity of IAT, there is
an important theoretical reason which helps put Fact 2 in perspective. Sup-
pose we toss the Weak Boethius thesis into our cauldron of assumptions; then,
IAT yields the further absurd consequence that A > C∧ B > ¬C is inconsistent
12This is to be expected given that it validates CEM and SDA. Note that the material con-
ditional is widely rejected as an analysis of the indicative conditional. One important class
of references here is the seminal work in Edgington 1995 (but see also the survey Edgington,
2014). But rejection of the material analysis of the conditional is a tenet in the relevance logic
tradition stemming from Anderson and Belnap 1975. What is even more important for our
purposes is that we take our assumptions to be equally valid for counterfactuals as well, and
virtually nobody believes that counterfactual conditionals are material conditionals.
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(whenever A and B are consistent).13 We submit that this would be an absurd
consequence.14
3.3 Strict conditionals
As is to be expected, these proof-theoretic results correspond to related results
at the semantic level. We approach the semantic landscape by considering how
CEM interacts with semantic theses that are related to SDA. Let’s begin with the
idea that > is a strict conditional. That is, > universally quantifies over a fixed
domain of worlds. More precisely, letting R be an accessibility relation over
worlds, and letting Rw be the set of R-accessible worlds from w:
(∆1) ~A> C = {w | Rw ∩ ~A ⊆ ~C}
Alonso-Ovalle 2006 notes that strict conditionals validate SDA.15
Unfortunately, this framework cannot accommodate both CEM and modus
ponens. While this result follows already from the syntactic result of the pre-
vious sections, it can be further illuminated by thinking in purely semantic
terms. In the strict framework, CEM and modus ponens correspond to con-
straints on the accessibility relation–respectively, uniqueness and reflexivity.
Uniqueness. ∀w,v,v′ : wRv ∧wRv′ =⇒ v = v′
Reflexivity. ∀w : wRw
The nature of the correspondence is the usual one from modal logic. That is to
say: Uniqueness is the weakest constraint that guarantees the validity of CEM.
Similarly, Reflexivity is the weakest constraint that guarantee the validity of
modus ponens.
The combination of these two constraints trivializes R, by entailing that
every world only accesses itself.
13Here is a sketch of the proof: this conjunction is not compatible with IAT under WBT be-
cause it entails that whenever A > C, we also must have ¬(A > ¬C)—ruling out the second dis-
junct of IAT— and whenever B > ¬C we must also have ¬(B > C)—ruling out the first disjunct
of IAT.
14One response to our incompatibility results would be to bite the bullet, and allow that
even counterfactuals are logically equivalent to material conditionals. We think the best way
to pursue this strategy might be with some form of the dynamic conditional in Gillies 2007
and Gillies 2009. Indeed, Gillies 2009 proposes that the indicative conditional is logically
equivalent to the material conditional, in order to validate Import-Export. But while the two
conditionals are logically equivalent, they are not semantically equivalent; their semantic value
are more fine grained than logical equivalence, in a way that predicts different behavior of the
two conditionals under higher operators, like negation. While we think this is an interesting
strategy to pursue, especially for indicative conditionals, we do not think that it is plausible
set in full generality. Recall that our baseline target is the subjunctive conditional, and it is
much less plausible to bite the bullet on subjunctives going in for the paradoxes of material
implication.
15When > is a strict conditional, it is downward monotone—that is, A |− B guarantees B > C |
− A > C. In this setting, SDA follows from the validity of disjunction introduction.
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Isolation. ∀w,v : wRv =⇒ v = w
Once again, > collapses onto the material conditional—its domain of quantifi-
cation being limited to the singleton set of the world of evaluation.
Recent defenders of strict conditionals (von Fintel 2001; Gillies 2007)
might shrug at this result, since they implement the view in the more com-
plex framework of dynamic semantics. In the context of dynamic semantics,
the correspondence results between axioms and constraints on models play
out differently. However, reflection on the consequence relation |− once again
yields a collapse result even for such sophisticated views. No matter how so-
phisticated, strict analyses must accept, for some choice of , the validity of:
Strictness. A > C | − (¬A∨C)
This too collapses in the presence of basic assumptions. To see this, note that,
given strictness, CEM corresponds to the validity of (¬A ∨ C) ∨ (¬A ∨ ¬C).
Consider the instance (¬> ∨ C) ∨ (¬> ∨ ¬C). Given the identity rule for
disjunction, C | − (¬> ∨ C). and because  is closed under substitution of
logical equivalents, |− C∨¬C. Suppose now that > validates modus ponens.
In light of strictness, this corresponds to the principle that  is strong, so that
C |− C. This last assumption allows us to infer the triviality of . That is,
it allows us to deduce C | − C. In particular, (¬A∨ C) | − (¬A∨ C), which
chained with strictness yields collapse.
We’ve now seen that CEM is quite difficult to reconcile with a strict condi-
tional analysis, on both model theoretic and more abstract grounds. This is
a surprising result. For von Fintel 1997’s analysis of only if conditionals, one
of the major arguments for the validity of CEM, requires that contraposition be
valid. This in turn implies the validity of Antecedent Strengthening, and more
generally implies that the conditional is strict. This suggests there is a serious
tension within that analysis.
4 Heresies in isolation
The results in the previous section suggest that the space to validate both
SDA and CEM is at best narrow. Before exploring it, we will constrain it further.
Faced with these results, defenders of SDA might be tempted to simply reject
CEM. After all, despite the evidence that supports it, the principle remains con-
troversial, and Lewis 1973 presented several potential counterexamples to it.
In this section, we want to highlight a few results to the effect that SDA
alone requires us to tread carefully. We have already noted a classic result
(Fine, 1975; Ellis et al., 1977; Santorio, 2017) to the effect that SDA together with
substitution of logical equivalents yields antecedent strengthening (which pat-
tern is invalidated by many theories). We present two more results in a similar
vein. The first establishes that a fully general statement of SDA—specifically
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one that involves modal consequents—is not compatible with the semantic as-
sumption that conditionals are strict conditionals. The second shows that we
can get collapse just by adding SDA to a more modest relative of CEM—the prin-
ciple that A∧C entails A > C (this result was first presented in Nute 1980b).
4.1 Might counterfactuals
Alonso-Ovalle 2006 observes that simplification of disjunctive antecedents
also occurs with might counterfactuals, as in the inference from (16) to (17).
(16) If Hiro or Ezra had come, we might have solved the puzzle.
(17) If Hiro had come, we might have solved the puzzle.
Additionally, he shows that strict accounts of counterfactuals cannot validate
this form of simplification, given a boolean semantics for disjunction.
It will be convenient to take If A, might B as idiomatic. Formally, we write
this as A >^ B. With this in hand we can state:
^-SDA. (A or B) >^ C |− (A >^ C)∧ (B >^ C)
To explore whether ^-SDA is valid, we must provide >^ with a semantics.
Towards this goal, suppose that might-counterfactuals existentially quantify
over the very same domain that would-counterfactuals universally quantify
over.
(∆2) ~A >^ C = {w | Rw ∩ ~A∩ ~C , ∅}
Suppose finally that the accessibility relation R is reflexive–which as we noted
corresponds to the validity of modus ponens.16
Note that, because we do not derive >^ compositionally,^-SDA is not sim-
ply a special case of SDA. Nonetheless, ^-SDA is very much in the spirit of SDA
itself, and plausibly supported by many of the same intuitive considerations
that support SDA.
We can prove a surprising result that constrains the range of acceptable
semantic values for disjunction. Under the assumptions we made about >^,
the semantic value of disjunction cannot be a proposition, even if the disjuncts
are propositional. (By proposition, we mean a set of worlds.)
Fact 3 Assume (∆1), (∆2), the reflexivity of R and the validity of both SDA and
-SDA. Then disjunction is not propositional.
16The result of this subsection can be proven on the basis of a weaker assumption than
reflexivity: that for every world w, there is a world v such that vRw. However, the main path to
a justification of this constraint is via reflexivity.
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Proof: Consider arbitrary propositions ~A (abbreviated: A) and
~B (abbreviated: B). We prove that there can be no function or,
such that or(A,B) (which we write in infix notation as A or B) such
that A or B = ~A or B. We establish that (i)^-SDA requires A or B ⊆
A∩B; and (ii) SDA requires A∪B ⊆A or B. These two requirements
are inconsistent whenever A , B .
Ad (i): let C be an arbitrary proposition. The validity of ^-SDA re-
quires that if Rw ∩C overlaps A or B, then it overlaps A∩B. But
now suppose A or B * A∩B. Then there is a v in the former set,
but not the latter. By reflexivity v ∈ Rv . Now, consider the special
case C = {v}. Then we must have that C overlaps both A and B,
but because it’s a singleton, it cannot do that without overlapping
both, so v ∈A∩B after all, which is contradictory.
Ad (ii): let C be an arbitrary proposition and w an arbitrary world.
The validity of SDA requires that if (Rw∩ (A or B)) ⊆ C, (Rw∩A) ⊆ C
and (Rw ∩B) ⊆ C. Now, suppose for reductio that A∪B * A or B.
Then there is a u that belongs to the former set but not the latter. By
reflexivity u ∈ Ru . Now let C = (A or B). We claim that u ∈ C which
would be contradictory, since u was chosen so that u < (A or B).
This must follow because u ∈A∪B, and hence either u ∈A or u ∈ B.
In the first case u ∈ (Ru ∩A) ⊆ C; in the second, u ∈ (Ru ∩B) ⊆ C.
Either way u ∈ C.
In fact, this proof establishes something slightly stronger. There can be no
sentences A and B with distinct semantic values where SDA and ^-SDA hold for
them, paired with any consequent.
4.2 Strong Centering
Our main result so far has been that CEM and SDA lead to Collapse. In one
respect, this is unsurprising. Nute 1980b (p. 40), Butcher 1983, and Walters
2009 have developed incompatibility results showing that SDA leads to trouble
in the presence of Strong Centering.
Strong Centering. A∧C |− A > C
For example, Butcher 1983 shows that SDA and Strong Centering imply that
the conditional is strict. Walters 2009 observes that these principles together
quickly lead to the validity of True Consequent, discussed above. But CEM and
Modus Ponens imply Strong Centering, and so in one respect these results rely
on weaker premises than our own.
On the other hand, these results all rely on more assumptions about dis-
junction than our own. Butcher 1983 relies on the absorption rule—the rule
encoding the equivalence of p and (p∨q)∧p. Walters 2009 relies on the validity
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of Disjunction Introduction. These assumptions are absent from our results.
For comparison and analysis, it will be useful to consider a simplified version
of the result in Walters 2009. Assume that or is minimally classical, in the
sense that it obeys the following instance of Disjunction Introduction.
Identity. > |− > or A
Given identity, SDA and Strong Centering imply collapse to the material con-
ditional.
Fact 4 (Walters) Given the classical package, SDA, Strong Centering, and Identity:
A > C | − ¬A∨C
Proof. The crucial step in this proof is to show that our assumptions
validate the True Consequent inference, that C |− A > C. From there,
the proof proceeds like the proof of Fact 1.
1. C |− (> or A)∧C identity, classical package
2. (> or A)∧C |− (> or A) > C Strong Centering
3. (> or A) > C |− A > C SDA
4. C |− A > C 1-3, transitivity
As anticipated, we note that Fact 4 is in one sense stronger than Fact 1, because
it relies on a principle weaker than CEM. This does not make Fact 1 redundant
since, unlike that earlier result, it appeals to a specific assumption about nat-
ural language or. Even more significantly, it does not make Fact 2 redundant,
since that result did not depend on assuming modus ponens for >. These con-
siderations are important because the fewer the assumptions, the narrower the
space for the heresies to co-exist. Furthermore, as we move to a more construc-
tive part of the paper, it is heuristically valuable to focus on results like Fact
2—results which do not depend on entertaining artificial disjunctions such as
> or A.
5 Alternatives
We have developed a variety of incompatibility results, showing that SDA and
CEM are in considerable tension with one another. Given these results, the
prospects for reconciling these principles might appear bleak. We now turn to
developing strategies for dealing with this tension.
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5.1 The alternatives package
Our first attempt builds on earlier attempts to validate SDA using alternative
semantics in the style of Alonso-Ovalle 2006. While that framework holds
fixed the variably strict analysis in Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973, we show
that the crucial ideas from alternative semantics are independent of the under-
lying theory of conditionals. We provide a general mechanism for taking any
truth conditional semantics for the conditional and producing an alternative
semantics from it that validates SDA. The resulting theory restricts the validity
of CEM to non-disjunctive antecedents, which is how it blocks the proofs of the
incompatibility results.
In alternative semantics, sentences do not denote propositions, but instead
sets of propositions (or ‘alternatives’). In many cases the operations that lift
semantic values to this higher type are trivial. An atomic sentence p denotes
the singleton set of worlds at which p is true (i.e. {{w |w(p) = 1}}). Negation
denotes the set of worlds that are not in the union of its argument; conjunction
is pointwise intersection.
(∆3) ~¬A = {W −⋃~A}
(∆4) ~A∧B = {A∩B |A ∈ ~A,B ∈ ~B}
These operations are classical in the sense that when the semantic values are
singleton sets of propositions they collapse on the standard Boolean connec-
tives (more precisely: they collapse on the intensional analogues of comple-
mentation and intersection).
The main element of non-classicality at the ground-floor of alternative
semantics is the treatment of disjunctions. The idea is that a disjunction
A or C presents both of A and C as alternatives. In the system we adopt here,
this means that the semantic value of a disjunction is the union of the semantic
values of the disjuncts.
(∆5) ~A or B = ~A∪ ~B}
This has the non-classical effect that a disjunction can denote a non-singleton
set even when its disjuncts both denote singletons.
This behavior of disjunction is essential to the treatment of simplification.
To validate SDA, we let the conditional operate on each alternative in this set.17
The main idea is to derive the meaning of the conditional from an under-
lying propositional conditional operator >—the ‘proto-conditional’—which
17We can think of several other approaches to SDA as offering different proposals about
what exactly the alternatives for a disjunction are. For example, the state-based semantics
from Fine 2012 and Briggs 2012 can be interpreted so that the meaning of a sentence is a set
of propositions, in which case roughly it claims that the alternatives for a disjunction are the
proposition expressed by each disjunct, as well as their intersection. These alternatives can
then be processed further through different notions of truthmaking. Similarly, Santorio 2017
suggests a syntactic procedure for determining the alternatives for a sentence.
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maps a pair of propositions to a new proposition. The conditional > then ap-
plies to the proto-conditional operator to every alternative in the antecedent.
(∆6) ~A>C =
{⋂{A > C |A ∈ ~A} | C ∈ ~C}
To simplify a bit more, suppose the set of propositions in ~A is {B1, ...,Bj} de-
noted by the sentences B1, ...,Bj . Then A > C is true just in case each of the
conditionals (B1 > C), ..., (Bj > C) is true. In general, the alternative sensitive
conditional is a generalized conjunction of a series of protoconditionals, dis-
tributed over the antecedent alternatives.18 To recycle one of our early exam-
ples, the truth-conditions of Hiro or Ezra > puzzle demand the truth of both:
Hiro > puzzle and Ezra > puzzle.
To define entailment, we flatten the semantic values of the relevant sen-
tences. Arguments are valid just in case the union of the conclusion is true
whenever the union of all the premises are true.
(∆7) A1, . . . ,An |= C iff⋂
i∈[1,n]
(
⋃
~Ai) ⊆⋃~C
This proposal guarantees that disjunction behaves as classically as possi-
ble. Since entailment is only sensitive to the closed form of a sentence, the
alternative sensitive disjunction or must satisfy both disjunction introduction
and proof by cases. In addition, the proposal yields the DeMorgan equivalence
that A or B is equivalent to ¬(¬A∧¬B).
A further consequence is that logical equivalence is less fine grained than
equivalence of meaning. While A or B and ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B) are co-entailing, they
do not have the same meaning. The disjunction, but not the negated conjunc-
tion, denotes a set of alternatives. For this reason, our logic for conditionals
is hyperintensional in the sense that substituting logical equivalents in condi-
tional antecedents does not guarantee equivalence of the resulting condition-
als. Conditionals with disjunctive antecedents simplify, while conditionals
with negated conjunctions in the antecedent do not.19
It is time to turn to our collapse results. In this framework, regardless of
what > means,
~(A or B) > C = ~A> C∩ ~B> C
This evidently guarantees that SDA is valid.
Whether CEM is valid depends in part on the choice of proto-conditional >.
Suppose for instance that, following Stalnaker 1968, we interpret > in terms
of a selection function f that, given a world w and proposition A, returns the
unique closest world to w where A holds.
~A> C = {w | f (w,~A) ∈ ~C}
18For an implementation of the same idea in inquisitive semantics, with a similar purpose
to the one we have here, see Ciardelli 2016 and Ciardelli et al. 2017.
19This is why this proposal avoids the classic collapse result in Ellis et al. 1977, connecting
simplification with antecedent strengthening.
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Then CEM is valid for > when the antecedent is not disjunctive.20
More generally, the validity of CEM for non-disjunctive antecedents corre-
sponds to the following condition restricted to non-disjunctive A:
W = ~A> C∪ ~A > ¬C
Because of this correspondence, even this restricted validation of CEM will fail
if the proto-conditional does not itself validate CEM.
It is a simple corollary of our negative result that there is no non-trivial
choice of proto-conditional that validates CEM for disjunctive antecedents. In
a case where some alternatives guarantee C and some guarantee ¬C, CEM fails.
We summarize the two signature properties of the semantics above in a
single statement.
Fact 5
1. For any operator >, (A or B) > C |= (A > C)∧ (B > C)
2. For any operator >, if > validates CEM, then > validates CEM for any A not
containing or .
One last remark: the alternatives approach does not require that condi-
tionals with disjunctive antecedents always go in for simplification. To avoid
this result, we can introduce a closure operation which flattens alternatives.
(∆8) ~!A = ~¬¬A = {⋃~A}
We can then allow ! to occur in the antecedent of conditionals, generating the
form !(A∨B) > C. This would account for some localized failures of simplifi-
cation, such as the classic example If Spain had fought on the side of the Allies or
on the side of the Nazis, it would have fought for the Allies.21
5.2 Evaluation
The alternative semantics approach dodges our first two theorems because
those results rely on applying CEM to a disjunctive antecedent, and then apply-
ing simplification. By blocking CEM for disjunctive antecedents, both proofs
are blocked. The approach reflects a conservative response to our incompat-
ibility results: it quarantines conditionals with disjunctive antecedents and
allows CEM only for conditionals that cannot be manipulated via SDA.
20Our flattened definition of entailment plays an important role in proving this. We have:
|= (A > C)∨ (A > ¬C) iffW ⊆
⋃
~(A > C)∨ (A > ¬C)
But ~(A > C)∨ (A > ¬C) is the set containing ~A> C and ~A > ¬C, so its union is the set of
worlds where one of these conditionals holds. Since either C or ¬C is guaranteed to hold at
f (w,~A), this last is guaranteed.
21See McKay and Inwagen 1977 and Alonso-Ovalle 2006 for discussion.
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This immediately raises the question whether the motivation for CEM re-
quires its validity for disjunctive antecedents. If it does not, then we can
rest content with the proposal of this section as a solution to our motivat-
ing concerns. Unfortunately, however, the arguments for CEM do not appear to
discriminate against disjunctive antecedents. Let us run through those argu-
ments again with the specific case of disjunctive antecedents in mind.
I. Scope relations. (18) and (19) sound equivalent in just the same way that (5)
and (6) do.
(18) I doubt that if you had slept in or goofed off, you would have passed.
(19) I believe that if you had slept in or goofed off, you would have failed.
Similarly, we observe a duality effect with disjunctive antecedents under no
and every. As before, (20) and (21) appear equivalent.
(20) No student would have succeeded if he had goofed off in class or par-
tied the night before the exam.
(21) Every student would have failed if he had goofed off in class or partied
the night before the exam.
By restricting CEM to non-disjunctive antecedents, the analysis renounces these
predictions. Suppose that goofing off does imply failure, but that partying
does not. In this case, the analysis predicts that the scope of (20) is false for
any student, and so (20) is true. By contrast, (21) is false, since partying does
not guarantee failure.
This gives rise to several questions. First, do (20) and (21) have any read-
ing on which they are not equivalent? Such a reading is predicted to exist by
the account above, by removing the closure operator. If no such reading is
available, the account above would need supplementation with a theory of the
distribution of existential closure operators. Perhaps such operators are for
some reason obligatory when disjunction occurs under the scope of a quanti-
fier. This allows disjunction to behave classically, leading to the equivalence
of (20) and (21). Moreover, this is a tool that is independently needed.
Another natural question here is whether there is a reading of the quan-
tified conditionals (20) and (21) on which they are consistent, and yet both
go in for simplification. Indeed, Santorio 2017 suggests that at least negative
quantified conditionals display exactly this effect:
(22) None of my friends would have fun at the party if Alice or Bob went.
(23) None of my friends would have fun at the party if Alice went.
(24) None of my friends would have fun at the party if Bob went.22
22See Santorio 2017 10.
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Such a combination of effects would be quite paradoxical, since it seems to
require the validity of SDA and CEM even for disjunctive antecedents, and yet
also require the validity of the Weak Boethius Thesis (WBT). Yet these princi-
ples seem jointly inconsistent, since the former two principles imply collapse
to the material conditional, which is inconsistent with WBT. Concluding, we do
think that the interaction between quantifiers and conditionals with disjunc-
tive antecedents presents a problem for the current analysis.
II. ‘Only if’ conditionals. we saw that CEM helps derive the meaning of only if
conditionals compositionally—i.e. on the basis of the interaction of only and
conditionals. But, as above, it is implausible to restrict this phenomenon to
conditionals with non-disjunctive antecedents.
(25) The flag flies only if the King or Queen is home.
(26) If the flag flies, then the King or Queen is home.
(27) The flag flies if the King or Queen isn’t home.
Here, it is clear that (25) does imply (26), just as we saw earlier that (11) im-
plied (12). This is a problem for the analysis above, which denies CEM for
conditionals with disjunctive antecedents. For, again, a natural way to predict
this entailment is through the idea that only negates alternatives, and that (27)
is an alternative to the conditional in (25). But if CEM fails for disjunctive an-
tecedents, then the negation of (27) will not imply the contraposition of (26),
which is essential in von Fintel 1997’s account.
6 Homogeneity
In the previous section, we developed a tool for taking any theory of condition-
als and enriching it with alternatives. While this theory provides an elegant
treatment of SDA, it faces problems with CEM. The theory invalidates CEM for
disjunctive antecedents.
In this section, we develop an approach with complementary features.
Building on von Fintel 1997, we now develop a tool for taking any theory of
conditionals and enforcing CEM. This new tool will have an advantage: any pat-
tern that is valid relative to the underlying conditional remains valid when the
conditional is enriched with presuppositions. So if we start with an SDA val-
idating conditional, we can force it to validate CEM. To avoid our collapse re-
sults, the theory gives up the transitivity of entailment.
6.1 Homogeneity presuppositions
The theoretical device that will yield this result is the idea of homogeneity.
Homogeneity presuppositions have been invoked to explain certain otherwise
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problematic variants of excluded middle for plural definites.23 It is worth
indulging on plural definites because there is a parallel problem to one of our
impossibility results providing us with a template for how we might go about
addressing it.
Here is the problem: observe first that predications involving plural defi-
nites, like (28), plausibly license inferences to universal claims like (29).
(28) The cherries in my yard are ripe.
(29) All the cherries in my yard are ripe.
If some but not all cherries are ripe, one would not be in a position to assert
(28). Furthermore, plural definites plausibly exclude the middle. That is, the
following sounds like a logical truth:
(30) Either the cherries in my yard are ripe or they (=the cherries in my
yard) are not ripe.
If someone were to utter (30), they would sound just about as informative as
if they had made a tautological statement (although you might learn from it
that they have cherries in their yard). The problem is that, starting with (30)
and exploiting entailments like the one from (28) to (29) as well as standard
validities for disjunction, we can reason our way to
(31) Either all the cherries in my yard are ripe or all the cherries in my yard
are not ripe.
That seems puzzling: did we just prove, from logical truths and valid infer-
ence patterns, that my yard cannot have some ripe cherries and some non-ripe
ones? Of course, something must have gone wrong. The homogeneity view of
plural definites explains what that is: first, plural definites carry a presuppo-
sition of homogeneity: the F’s are G’s presupposes that the F’s are either ho-
mogeneously G’s or homogeneously not G’s. If this presupposition is satisfied,
their content is that all F’s are G’s. The sense in which (30) sounds tautological
is that it cannot be false if its homogeneity presupposition is satisfied. Simi-
larly, the sense in which (28) entails (29) is that if the presupposition of (28)
is satisfied and (28) is true, (29) cannot fail to be true. But even if we can ex-
ploit these to deduce (31) we do not have license to claim that (31) is valid:
our justification for (30) and for the (28)-(29) entailment did not discharge the
homogeneity presupposition.
6.2 Homogeneity without presuppositions
More recently, some authors have sought to disentangle the idea of homogene-
ity from the presuppositional implementation of von Fintel 1997. Križ (2015a,
23See for example von Fintel 1997 and Križ 2015a.
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ch. 1) argues that the presuppositional implementation is dubious for definite
plurals because homogeneity effects do not project in same way as presuppo-
sitions. Križ views homogeneity as a requirement of truth in the context of a
trivalent intensional semantics. Another possible motivation for this trivalent
stance is that the theory of homogeneity presuppositions seems to force unin-
tuitive predictions about the subjective probabilities that it is natural to assign
to the contents of sentences that do carry homogeneity requirements (Cariani
and Santorio 2018; for an experimental study of judgments of probability in
the context of homogeneity, see Cremers et al. 2017).24
While we speak of ‘homogeneity presuppositions’, we want to be ulti-
mately neutral about which treatment of this phenomenon is to be imple-
mented. Our framework can take on board whatever analysis of homogeneity
turns out to be best (for example, it will be clear in the next section that our
formalism for managing presupposition could be interpreted much more ab-
stractly).
Before moving on, however, it is worth mentioning another way in which
the homogeneity of definite plurals and the homogeneity of conditionals might
come apart. Definite plurals can sometimes carry exceptions. The truth of the
team members look happy in this picture seems compatible with there being an
ordinarily grumpy team member who also is not happy in the picture. As a
more extreme example of this phenomenon, consider from some desert loca-
tions, you can see the stars which is perfectly compatible with lots of stars not
being visible. Linguists refer to this phenomenon as ‘non-maximality’.25 The
relevant point is that the non-maximality of plural definites needn’t corre-
spond to non-maximality phenomena for conditionals. Conditionals too may
carry exceptions in the sense that not all antecedent-worlds need be consequent-
worlds. However, we do not assume at the outset that the explanation for these
non-maximality phenomena must be identical.
6.3 Forcing CEM via homogeneity
A treatment of CEM using homogeneity presuppositions is found in von Fintel
1997. It allows that there may be more than one relevant world where the
antecedent of a conditional is true. The key idea is that A > C presupposes that
either all of the relevant worlds where A is true are worlds where C is true,
or they are all worlds where C is false. The A-worlds must be "homogeneous"
with respect to the consequent.
For simplicity, we think of presuppositions as definedness conditions, and
we model definedness conditions by introducing a third truth value # into
24That said, the trivalent intensional semantics does require developing a non-classical
probability theory to make sense of the relevant probability judgments—so, it doesn’t come
cost-free. Still, there is work on non-classical probability over trivalent logics with direct appli-
cations to conditionals, such as Rothschild 2014.
25For some relevant recent work, see Malamud 2012; Križ 2015b; Križ and Spector 2017.
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our semantics. Now the semantic value of a sentence is a total function from
worlds into {0,#,1}. The advantage of introducing an explicit third truth value
is that we can then model presupposition projection by specifying the way in
which # interacts with the ordinary boolean operations of function comple-
ment, union, and intersection. For simplicity, we’ll work with a weak Kleene
theory of projection, on which any definedness failures percolate upwards
through boolean operations.26
(∆9) Where p and q are total functions from worlds to {0,#,1}:
1.p − q = λw : p(w) , # , q(w) . p(w) = 1 and q(w) , 1
2.p∩ q = λw : p(w) , # , q(w) . p(w) = 1 and q(w) = 1
3.p∪ q = λw : p(w) , # , q(w) . p(w) = 1 or q(w) = 1
We can now define semantic values for our language in terms of the usual set-
theoretic operations, and know that projection will work just as we intended
it to. An additional benefit is that we could, if we wanted, change our theory
of projection to another simply by modifying the definition above, rather than
intervening on the semantic clauses.
It is also possible to generalize von Fintel 1997 by reformulating the the-
ory without any appeal to quantification over worlds. Instead, we provide
a general recipe for taking any conditional operator >, and enriching it with
homogeneity presuppositions to create a new conditional, ...>.
(∆10) ~A ...> C(w) = λw : (~A > C∪ ~A > ¬C)(w) = 1. ~A > C(w)
To talk about SDA and CEM, we also need appropriate assumptions about ¬
and ∨. These connectives must allow homogeneity presuppositions to project
in the right way.
Our earlier work on trivalent set-theoretic operations pays off here, since
we can just use the usual Boolean definitions of ¬ and ∨. Where W is λw. 1:
(∆11) ~¬A =W − ~A
(∆12) ~A∨B = ~A∪ ~B
The result of combining these clauses with (∆9) is a weak Kleene projection
pattern. Notably, for instance, (∆12) entails that a disjunctions is defined only
if each of its disjuncts is defined.27
26Throughout, we let ‘λx : f (x). g(x)’ denote the smallest function mapping any x which
satisfies f to 1 or 0, depending on whether x is g, and which maps any other x to #.
27This assumption is slightly stronger than what we need in order to predict the validity of
CEM. For example, we could also allow a more complex pattern of presupposition projection
for disjunction, where the second disjunct treats the first disjunct as part of its local context, as
in Heim 1992. But this won’t be relevant in what follows, so we stick to the current formulation
for simplicity.
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Finally, to get predictions about our collapse results, we need a definition
of consequence. The leading candidate for languages involving presupposi-
tions is Strawson-validity (Strawson, 1952; von Fintel, 1997, 1999, 2001). Ac-
cording to this notion, an argument is valid just in case the conclusion is true
whenever the conclusion is defined and the premises are true.
(∆13) A1; . . . ;An |= C iff ~C(w) = 1 whenever:
•~A1(w) = 1 and . . . and ~An(w) = 1.
•~C(w) , #.
Now let’s turn to our collapse results. The first important result is that
CEM is valid regardless of the choice of proto-conditional. That is, for any
operator >, ...> satisfies CEM. The key idea that supports this is that ...> builds
in a homogeneity presupposition—that either A > C or A > ¬C is true. Further,
the validity of CEM requires that (A > C)∨ (A > ¬C) is true whenever defined.
Since disjunctions inherit the presuppositions of their first disjunct, we know
that this whole disjunction is therefore defined only if it is true.
Our conditional ...> is guaranteed to validate CEM. To deal with our col-
lapse results, let’s now consider SDA. Here, the key result is that any proto-
conditional > that validates SDA induces a new conditional ...> that also val-
idates SDA. Indeed, this is not unique to simplification. To see why, note first
that any conditional > differs from its homogeneous counterpart ...> only in
their presuppositions. But this guarantees that any inference containing >
remains valid when > is replaced with ...>. After all, the resulting formula
differs from the original only by containing extra presuppositions. But given
our definition of validity, this only makes it easier for the relevant inference to
be valid. So in particular if we know that (A or B) > C implies (A > C)∧ (B > C),
we can infer that (A or B) ...> C implies (A ...> C)∧ (B ...> C). This follows from
the monotonicity of classical entailment. After all, an argument is Strawson
valid just in case the result of strengthening the argument’s premises with the
presuppositions of the conclusion is classically valid.
Fact 6
1. For any operator >, |= (A ...> C)∨ (A ...> ¬C)
2. For any operator >, if > validates SDA, then ...> validates SDA.
We now have a completely general recipe for validating both SDA and CEM. But
is it a recipe for triviality? That is, do we have that for any operator > that
validates SDA, ...> collapses to the material conditional? The answer to both
questions is "no".
There are many choices of protoconditional for which ...> is not trivial.
A first example is if we let > be a generic strict conditional. To see how this
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theory avoids triviality, let us look at the semantic correlates of some of the
entailments we used in the proof of our first collapse result. For simplicity,
let’s simply see how a generic strict conditional > deals with the problem. The
first step of the proof corresponds to this semantic fact: (32) is a logical truth.
(32) [(A∨¬A) ...> C]∨ [(A∨¬A) ...> ¬C]
Although (32) is true whenever defined, it is quite difficult for it to be defined.
Given our account of ∨, the definedness of (A ∨ ¬A) > C is equivalent to the
requirement that either Rw ⊆ ~C or Rw ⊆ ~¬C. One of C and ¬C must be
necessary at w for (32) to be defined.
Now, the reasoning connecting the first two steps of our proof also has a
matching semantic fact: (33) entails (34).
(33) [(A∨¬A) ...> C]∨ [(A∨¬A) ...> ¬C]
(34) [(A ...> C∧¬A ...> C)∨ [(A ...> ¬C∧¬A ...> ¬C)]
This holds because if (32) is defined, then the domain Rw uniformly consists of
C-worlds or it uniformly consists of ¬C-worlds. Either way, (34) must be true.
Despite the validity of (32) and the entailment from (32) to (34), (34) is
not itself valid. The definedness conditions of (34) are laxer than those of (32):
for this reason (34) has a much better shot of being false. For instance (34) is
false in a model that contains two worlds w and v with w verifying A and C
and v verifying ¬A and ¬C.28 But such a model does not impugn the validity
of (32) under Strawson entailment, because its disjuncts are undefined.
In broad strokes, an instance of transitivity—in particular, one of the form
|= A, A |= B, therefore |= B—fails for Strawson entailment (Smiley, 1967). This is
possible because |= A only requires that A be true if defined; meanwhile, A |= B
also holds because the presuppositions of A are essentially involved in guaran-
teeing the truth of B. But |= B fails because here we are not allowed to assume
that the presuppositions of A are satisfied. The same diagnosis applies to our
second impossibility result. The first step of the proof claims the validity of
[(A or B) > C]∨[(A or B) > ¬C]. The argument establishes that this claim entails
IAT.29 However, the validity of IAT does not follow.
Finally, it’s worth considering how our theory handles incompatibility re-
sults connecting SDA and Strong Centering, like those in Butcher 1983 and
Walters 2009. For illustration, we’ll focus on Fact 4. Suppose we have a proto-
conditional that satisfies modus ponens (so that CEM entails Strong Centering)
and SDA. Then, we accept
(i) (> or A)∧C |− (> or A) > C.
28Here we assume ∧ is definable in terms of ¬ and ∨, with the analogous definedness condi-
tions.
29Despite involving two applications of transitivity, the argument up to step (7) can be repli-
cated for Strawson entailment.
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Second, we validate SDA, so that
(ii) (> or A) > C |− A > C.
But we disallow the chaining together of these two entailment claims to yield
(iii).
(iii) (> or A)∧C |− A > C
The crucial distinction is that (ii) presupposes that the worlds that satisfy
(> or A) are homogeneously C or ¬C. Under this extra assumption, the con-
clusion that A > C follows. But this modal information is not contributed by
the premises of (iii) which instead must fail.
6.4 Synthesis
Let us take stock of what we have argued: a generic strict conditional > can
validate both SDA and CEM, when enriched with homogeneity presuppositions.
Here, however, we must take care. The resulting theory validates SDA, but
invalidates ^-SDA. That is, the analogue of simplification of disjunctive an-
tecedents for if ... might ... fails. This is a problem because ^-SDA sounds no
less plausible than SDA itself.
We faced a symmetrical problem with >. There, simplification was un-
restrictedly valid. But CEM was valid only for non-disjunctive antecedents. To
fully validate simplification, we propose a synthesis of our two tools. In par-
ticular, we suggest that the English conditional recruits both alternatives and
homogeneity presupposition. To signal this, we introduce the new connective
...>. Start with any conditional meaning >. Then apply the alternative sensi-
tive enrichment from (∆6), to get >. In light of Fact 1, the resulting semantics
validates both SDA and ^-SDA, but invalidates CEM for disjunctive antecedents.
To force the unrestricted validity of CEM, enrich this conditional with homo-
geneity presuppositions according to the recipe in (∆8), so as to get ...>.
More precisely, given an arbitrary proto-conditional >, we characterize
...> by the clause:
(∆14) ~A ...> B = {λw : ∃v ∈ {0,1}
∀A ∈ ~A (A > B)(w) = v . ∀A ∈ ~A (A > B)(w) = 1 | B ∈ ~B}
Not every result of applying this recipe to a proto-conditional is guar-
anteed to yield a non-collapsing conditional. For example, if we choose the
material conditional as a proto-conditional, we get back a conditional that
agrees with the material conditional whenever defined. On the other hand,
no choice of proto-conditional can generate the identical definedness condi-
tions and truth conditions of the material conditional.
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Importantly, however, there are choices of proto-conditional for which the
recipe does not yield a collapsing conditional. In particular, a natural option
for the proto-conditional is the Lewisian variably strict conditional. The un-
derlying Lewisian operator allows that there may be multiple worlds where
the antecedent is true that are relevant to the evaluation of the consequent.
Then the conditional that results from applying the procedure above is dou-
bly homogeneous. First, the conditional presupposes that the antecedent alter-
natives either all guarantee the consequent, or all guarantee the consequent’s
negation. Second, for each antecedent alternative, the conditional presupposes
that either all of the relevant worlds where that alternative holds are worlds
where the consequent is true, or they are all worlds where the consequent
is false. Perhaps surprisingly, this theory more or less has already been devel-
oped and endorsed, for somewhat different reasons, in Santorio 2017. Another
option would be to start with a strict proto-conditional, and apply both of our
procedures. Furthermore, subjunctive and indicative conditionals might differ
in exactly this respect: in which proto-conditional operator they are generated
from.30
7 Intransitive Entailment?
It may seem that rejecting the transitivity of entailment is too high a price
to pay. If entailment is understood as necessary truth-preservation (which of
course is not how we characterized it), transitivity should be a basic property.
How much do we give up by moving to an intransitive notion of entailment?
And is it worth it?
The first thing to notice is that the intransitivity of Strawson entailment
is not an artifact of our development. For example, if Strawson Entailment is
30Our proposal results from applying the two tools in a specific order: the alternatives-first
strategy we follow, denoted by ...>, takes a protoconditional and transforms it into an alterna-
tive sensitive conditional. Then it adds on a layer of homogeneity presuppositions, requiring
that either every antecedent alternative make the protoconditional true, or every such alter-
native make it false. . But, of course, there is another option: the homogeneity-first strategy,
represented by  ...>, takes a protoconditional and first adds homogeneity presuppositions. It
then adds in a layer of alternative sensitivity, where A  ...> C says that for every antecedent
alternative, either every relevant scenario where that alternative holds makes the consequent
true, or every such scenario makes the consequent false.
It turns out that this homogeneity first strategy makes different predictions than the alterna-
tives first strategy. In particular, it leads to a conditional with strictly weaker presuppositions
than our own, but with the same truth conditions whenever defined. For consider some arbi-
trary disjunction A or B (with A and B non-disjunctive) and suppose we have A > C and B > ¬C
for some proto-conditional satisfying the Weak Boethius Thesis. Then our preferred condi-
tional above makes (A or B) ...> C undefined. By contrast, in the homogeneity first approach
the relevant disjunctive conditional ((A or B)  ...> C) is defined. After all, our layer of alterna-
tive sensitivity simply says that every alternative in the antecedent leads to true when plugged
into a protoconditional. If each input to this operation is defined, the whole thing should be as
well. For this reason, the homogeneity first approach gives up CEM on the disjunctive fragment
of the language. It thus offers no advance with respect to our incompatibility results, compared
with an ordinary alternative sensitive treatment of SDA.
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adopted to characterize entailment in a language with presuppositions, tran-
sitivity can fail in garden variety inferences involving definite descriptions —
Strawson’s original application of the framework. Consider:
(35) The King of France is either bald or not bald
This is Strawson valid (that is: assuming its presupposition is satisfied it must
be true). (35) also Strawson-entails this quantified claim:
(36) There is a unique x that is King of France and x is either bald or not
bald.
Whenever the presuppositions of (35) and (36) are satisfied, and (35) is true,
then so is (36). However, (36) is not itself Strawson valid.
Furthermore, the violations of transitivity in our framework are highly
localized. Recall our formulation of Transitivity and Cut:
Transitivity. if A |− B and B |− C, then A |− C
Cut. if X |− B and Y ,B |− C, then X,Y |− C
Generally speaking: Transitivity (and Cut) can only fail, in the context of
Strawson entailment, if B plays an essential role in satisfying the presuppo-
sitions of C.
As a consequence, various restricted forms of Transitivity and Cut are un-
affected. Specifically, there are no violations of Transitivity and Cut when C is
presupposition-free. A bit more generally, there are no violations of Cut when
Y alone guarantees that all the presuppositions of C are satisfied (the case in
which C is presupposition-free is a limit case of this condition).
Depending on what we think motivates Transitivity (and Cut), these re-
stricted forms might be all we need.31 If we thought that generalizations about
entailment are supported by the intuitive plausibility of their instances, we
should not be troubled by the retreat to the restricted forms of the rules. The
usual norms for theory building apply here: at each theoretical choicepoint it
is imperative to map out the available options, and we think that among these
options one ought to consider letting entailment be intransitive. The cases in
which transitivity fails are not only relatively localized, but they are also not
obviously cases in which transitivity is supported.
31For other discussion of restrictions of Cut or Transitivity, see Smiley 1958, Tennant 1992,
Tennant 1994, Ripley 2013, Ripley 2015, Ripley forthcoming, Cobreros et al. 2012, Cobreros
et al. 2015. These last two papers provide a particularly interesting point of connection, since
they draw on a notion of entailment (‘strict-to-tolerant’) that can also be understood as Strawson
entailment in a three valued semantics. Since one of the main selling points of this definition of
entailment is the ability to retain a constellation of plausible principles and theses in the face
of paradoxes, the synergies between these approaches reinforces the individual arguments for
each.
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But perhaps the justification of these structural rules is not empirical or
intuitive, but purely conceptual. For example, Dummett 1975 (p. 306) fa-
mously objects that giving up transitivity "seems to undermine the whole no-
tion of proof and, indeed, to violate the concept of argument itself". Such
theorists would likely find our rejection of transitivity to border on the con-
tradictory (or, worse, to just be contradictory).
While we are not convinced that intransitivity is contradictory, it is worth
exploring the question of what could be done to reconcile our results with the
more conservative, "say no to intransitivity", stance. We consider three such
options.
7.1 Strawson entailment as pragmatic overlay.
Instead of claiming that entailment is intransitive, we might adopt a two-level
explanatory scheme on which the apparent validity of certain inferences is ac-
counted for in terms of a secondary, pragmatic relation. The playbook for this
reconciliation is set by Stalnaker’s discussion of reasonable inference. Stalnaker
famously characterizes reasonable inference as follows:
an inference from a sequence of assertions or suppositions (the
premises) to an assertion or hypothetical assertion (the conclusion)
is reasonable just in case, in every context in which the premises
could appropriately be asserted or supposed, it is impossible for
anyone to accept the premisses without committing himself to the
conclusion. (Stalnaker, 1975)
There is a tight connection between this pragmatic notion and Strawson en-
tailment. Without necessarily trying to reduce them to a common notion, we
might notice some important similarities.
First, reasonable inference is also intransitive. For example, a signature
application of reasonable inference is to the direct argument, from A or C to
the indicative conditional ¬A → C. In Stalnaker 1975, this argument is in-
valid, but counts as a reasonable inference. Likewise, because any classically
valid inference is a reasonable inference, the inference from A to A or C is also
reasonable. Nonetheless, these two inferences cannot be chained together: the
inference from A to ¬A → C is unreasonable, because the intermediate step
A or C can be unassertable in some scenarios in which A is true and assertable.
More generally, Stalnaker’s notion of ‘reasonable inference’ aims to tracks
preservation of assertibility. Strawson entailment can also be viewed as track-
ing preservation of assertibility. The difference is that the two are after some-
what different senses of "appropriate assertibility". In Stalnaker’s characteri-
zation this concept is entirely general, while Strawson’s is slightly more spe-
cialized and focuses on failures of assertibility due to presupposition failure.32
32One point of difference is that reasonable inference doesn’t involve the supposition that
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7.2 Three values and two-levels of entailment
The second option consists in replacing Strawson entailment with two tran-
sitive notions. The account of presupposition we have operated with is in
essence an intensional three-valued system with true, false and # as truth-
values.33 In such a system, we have (at least) two transitive options for defin-
ing entailment. We could think of entailment as preservation of truth, or we
could think of it as preservation of non-falsehood. These are often taken to
be in competition, but there is room for a kind of pluralism between them:
perhaps preservation of truth and preservation of non-falsehood can serve
distinct but complementary explanatory roles. In particular, judgments of
consequence are to be accounted for in terms of preservation of truth, while
judgments of logical truth have to be systematized in terms of preservation of
non-falsehood.34
A pluralist who accepts this idea can diagnose our leading puzzles as
equivocations. In particular, the pluralist can claim that CEM is undeniable
(in the sense that it can never be false), but it is not guaranteed to be true. In
particular, instances of the form (A or B) > C∨ (A or B) > ¬C cannot be false.
By contrast, SDA is truth-preserving but does not preserve non-falsehood. So,
if (A or B) > C is true, (A > C)∧ (B > C) must be. But if (A or B) > C is undefined,
(A > C) ∧ (B > C) might be false. Similar moves can be made for the parallel
cases of intransitivity of Strawson entailment: the cherries are ripe or the cherries
are not ripe is undeniable; whenever the cherries are ripe is true, all the cherries
are ripe must be (at least under standard semantic assumptions); but when the
cherries are ripe is undefined because of homogeneity failures, all the cherries
are ripe must be false.
The task for this kind of pluralist is to spell out more carefully the in-
tended division of labor between the various notions of entailment in such a
way that the approach doesn’t end up being a notational variant on Strawson
entailment. (In other words, why do we need two notions, when Strawson
entailment might do the job of both?) We leave it up to those who wants to
defend this view to spell out how this account is to be developed.
7.3 Indexed Entailment in Type Theory
For our last option, we build on a suggestion that was given to us in conver-
sation by Jeff Russell. Borrowing an idea from theoretical computer science,
we might characterize a whole family of indexed notions of entailment. For
instance, it is standard in type theory to index the entailment relation to an
the conclusion is assertible. But at some crucial junctures Stalnaker 1975 does appeal to a
variant of reasonable inference that involves that further supposition.
33The ‘intensional’ bit is important: we don’t want the conditional to be a truth-function.
34Compare Schroeder’s structurally parallel discussion in Schroeder (2010, fn. 12). Note
that Schroeder is engaged with a very different theoretical context. His goal is to study the
prospects for an expressivist view about truth (see also Schroeder forthcoming).
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assignment of variables (see Lambek and Scott, 1986, for a canonical presen-
tation, and in particular pp. 130-131). This means effectively that there is not
one notion of entailment, but a (typically infinite) set of them.
The key modification in our case would be to index entailment to a set of
presuppositions. A colorful way of thinking about this is that this proposal
relativizes entailment to a context (where in the background we have the idea
that contexts fix the relevant presuppositions). The work that is required to
make this approach work consists of explaining how the cluster of problems
we have identified should be addressed. One possible path towards this goal
is to think that instances of CEM only hold on those entailment notions that are
indexed to a homogeneity claim. In other words, we only get CEM in those con-
texts in which the A-worlds are presupposed to be homogeneously C-worlds
or homogeneously ¬C-worlds.
With this background, suppose that SDA was valid according to every no-
tion of entailment in the target class. This is how an analysis of our central re-
sult might play out on such an account. Recall that the problematic instances
of CEM have the form
(A or B) > C∨ (A or B) > ¬C
Such claims would only be valid in those contexts in which the set of pre-
suppositions includes or entails the corresponding instance of homogeneity.
But then, the corresponding instance of IAT would only be a logical truth for
those notions of entailment whose indexing presuppositions establish the cor-
responding instance of homogeneity (and hence of CEM). It may fail when the
indexing presuppositions do not establish the relevant CEM instances. This,
needn’t be a problematic result, and it would mirror our claim that IAT does
follow from CEM, but it doesn’t follow from the empty set of premises. But,
again, it needs to be shown that this is, in any substantive sense, different
from accepting one intransitive notion of entailment.
7.4 Taking stock
Our task in this positive part of the paper was to find room to reconcile CEM and
SDA, by blocking some of the problematic derivation. What is key to this effort
is the idea that, on the aggregate, the collection of notions that are involved
in explaining the acceptability of inferences must be capable of providing ex-
planations for intransitive-seeming behavior. This could be accomplished in
a variety of ways, some of which are consistent with the idea that entailment
is transitive and some that are not. It is beyond the scope of this essay to
argue conclusively that a boldly intransitive explanation in terms of Straw-
son entailment, understood as the primary notion of entailment, is superior to
the milder kind of pluralism we identified in §7.2. What we did accomplish,
however, was advancing the idea that any plausible picture on which CEM and
SDA might co-exist requires a pattern of explanation that can mirror the appar-
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ent intransitivity of the underlying phenomena. More substantively, we devel-
oped the framework of Homogeneous Alternative Semantics, which shows that
a semantic framework for conditionals can be built on an intransitive notion
of entailment without obvious drawbacks and even without drastic revisions
to the non-conditional fragment of the semantics.
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Appendix: Homogeneous Alternative Semantics
Definition 1 Where p and q are total functions from worlds to {0,#,1}:
1. p − q = λw : p(w) , # , q(w) . p(w) = 1 and q(w) , 1
2. p∩ q = λw : p(w) , # , q(w) . p(w) = 1 and q(w) = 1
3. p∪ q = λw : p(w) , # , q(w) . p(w) = 1 or q(w) = 1
Definition 2 Let ~·map sentences to sets of total functions from worlds to {0,#,1}:
1. ~p = {λw . w(p) = 1}
2. ~¬A = {W −⋃~A}
3. ~A∧B = {A∩B | A ∈ ~A,B ∈ ~B}
4. ~A∨B = ~A∪ ~B
5. ~A ...> B = {λw : ∃v ∈ {0,1} ∀A ∈ ~A (A > B)(w) = v . ∀A ∈ ~A (A > B)(w) = 1 | B ∈ ~B}
Definition 3 A1, . . . ,An |= C iff⋃~C(w) = 1 if:
1. ∀i ∈ [1,n] ⋃~Ai(w) = 1
2.
⋃
~C(w) ∈ {0,1}
Observation 1
1. (A∨B) ...> C |= (A ...> C)∧ (B ...> C)
2. |= (A ...> C)∨ (A ...> ¬C)
3. A∧C |= (A ...> C)
Observation 2
1. A |= A∨B
2. |= A∨¬A
3. If X,A |= C and Y ,B |= C, then X,Y , (A∨B) |= C
Observation 3
1. A;A ...> C |= C
2. |= A ...> A
3. A ...> B,B ...> C |= A ...> (B∧C)
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4. If X,B |= C, then X,A ...> B |= A ...> C
Observation 4
1. ¬A∨B 6|= A > B
2. 6|= (A ...> C∧B ...> C)∨ (A ...> ¬C∧B ...> ¬C)
3. Not: if X |= A and Y ,A |= B, then X,Y |= B.
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